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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2007

3 April 1951

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHIEF, EE

SUBJECT: Investigation of [] Recruiting Activities

1. On 22 March 1951 Chief, EE directed the writer to investigate various reports concerning a possible compromise of [] and the candidates which he had picked for possible aircrews. Reference cables are called out below and individually discussed.

2. [] 8595 (In 29163) dated 16 March 1951 stated that one of [] candidates had met one A. R. Lutosyawski described as possible Polish Communist agent. This cable was discussed with [] who stated that [] had categorically denied that he had ever talked with this candidate because he had heard of the contact between the candidate and Lutosyawski. To date Jackpot has not yet reported on Lutosyawski or his activities.

3. MUNI 2913 (In 29892) dated 20 March 1951 quoted [] as having stated that [] activities were known and claimed that it was also known that he was recruiting for American operations into Poland. As this was reported by [] the writer discussed the matter with [] in Munich on 27 March 1951 and found that [] had merely reported [] statement and knew none of the details. Having received [] permission to do so, the writer interviewed [] in London on 30 March 1951 when [] stated that the knowledge of [] recruiting activities was limited to himself, his two deputies and to [] further stated that he believed that [] completely reliable politically and that he personally believed that in view of the number of contacts made by [] that the operation had been done in a professional manner. [] suggested that if in the future any further recruitment of this type were to be carried on that he be warned first so that he would be prepared to give an appropriate cover story to the candidates and to any other persons who might become aware of the activities.

4. On 30 March 1951 [] and the writer had lunch with [] who stated that the interim Jackpot report on [] activities indicated "little smoke but no fire." [] went on to say that he was convinced that [] had done a good job and that he personally

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SECRET

SECRET

was surprised that the operation was not more widely known because of the number of candidates contacted by []

5. On 27 March 1951 the writer discussed the case with [] who had been separated from [] for a period of weeks and was, therefore, unaware of any actual details outside of the cable traffic which he had seen. [] stated, however, that he had full confidence in [] and he did not believe that [] or the candidates were compromised. He further stated that he considered [] professional ability to be very high and that his experience in dealing with [] indicated that [] had an excellent sense of the maintenance of security. [] did, however, warn the writer, a warning which was later substantiated by [] that the crew member who was returning from Greece to England might very easily go out of his way to make trouble for []

6. a. It is the findings of the writer that the consensus of opinion of both British and Americans is that [] is not compromised himself and that his professional ability and reliability is of a high level.

b. It is the findings of the writer that the candidates contacted by [] are not necessarily compromised inasmuch as it appears that their contacts with [] are known only to the top Polish political men who are currently employed as principal agents by EE-II. It is emphasized that the question of any of these candidates who might be hired living in England and operating from England would require the co-operation and probably the consent of Jagged/Jackpot and this question was not discussed with [] inasmuch as the cover and base for the proposed aircraft has not been settled in Washington. This question should be discussed with the British just as soon as Washington policy has been defined.

7. The primary cause of the knowledge of [] recruiting activities appears to stem from the fact that the field officers responsible did not stick to the letter of the original cable from Washington which requested the recruitment of aircrews. [] suggested that large aircraft would need ground support and that the crews would require housekeeping facilities, and he therefore contacted a great many more candidates than was necessary at the time. The case officer might have kept [] from contacting housekeeping types until he had checked with Washington on the necessity of such recruitment. It should have been foreseen and certainly should be foreseen in the future that when candidates drawn from foreign political groups are contacted with necessarily vague offers of employment that they will seek advice and guidance from their political "father confessors."

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SECRET

SECRET

8. In the case of [] the writer would like to point out that [] was in the employ of the British from approximately 1940 until 1950 and that during that period he was handled personally by []. It therefore may be reasonably assumed that [] activities in any direction are known to [] while [] is in England. The present plan of removing [] physically from England to Germany should remove [] from any influence other than American to which he might now be subject.

[]

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